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Abstract. In this study, I show that with the appropriate experimental strategy, a correspondence 
test can be adapted to investigate disability discrimination in the rental housing market. I focus on 
discrimination against blind tenants assisted by guide dogs in Italy and obtain very robust results. 
The utilization of three fictitious household tenants (that is, a married couple, a married couple 
with a blind wife who owns a guide dog, and a married couple where the wife is normal sighted 
and owns a pet dog) allows me to investigate whether discrimination is due to the blindness or to 
the guide dog. I find that apartment owners discriminate blind tenants because of the presence of 
the guide dog alone. According to the Italian law, this is indirect discrimination, which in the US 
corresponds to the refusal to provide reasonable accommodation. 
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1 Introduction 
Disabled people are protected against discrimination. Art. 21 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, 2000, states that any discrimination based on disability and other 
grounds shall be prohibited.1 However, a number of economic studies provide evidence that they 
are discriminated against in the labor market (Jones, 2008, for a literature review). Unfortunately, 
economic scholars have neglected to study disabled people discrimination also in the housing 
market; however, disability discrimination also in this market deserves attention: a dwelling is a 
primary necessity that determines social inclusion, job opportunities, and enjoyment of public 
services.  
This study proposes a new application of a standard field experiment to investigate disa-
bility discrimination in the rental housing market. The experiment focuses on people affected by 
blindness, who are more than 2.7 million in Europe alone (Pascolini & Mariotti, 2012). 
What field experiment is suitable to analyze discrimination against blind tenants? In the 
US, where disabled people are protected from discrimination in the housing market through the 
Reasonable Accommodation Under the Fair Housing Act, 2004, the Urban Institute (Turner et al., 
2005) suggests to use the “in-person audit test.” Two actors, playing the role of tenants enquiring 
about housing units, are matched over all characteristics except for one (one actor is blind and the 
other is not) or two (one actor is blind and owns a guide dog; the other actor neither is blind nor 
owns a dog). The disabled actor visits a number of housing agencies to inquire about available 
housing units; if he owns an assistance dog, he also requests a waiver of restrictions on, and fees 
                                                 
1
 There also are EU directives to which individual member countries should align their legislations. Directive 
2000/78/CE aims at combating employment discrimination also on grounds of disability. Directive Proposal COM, 
2008, 426, aims at protecting disabled people even beyond the employment market; however, because this directive 
is still a proposal, single countries’ legislations remain heterogeneous on this matter. 
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related to, the dog. The non-disabled actor who owns no dog visits the same housing agencies 
and inquires about housing units. There is evidence of discrimination against disabled tenants 
when the percentage of housing units made available for the disabled actor is statistically signifi-
cantly lower than that made available for the non-disabled actor. There is evidence of discrimina-
tion also when the blind applicant receives a refusal to accommodate his guide dog in the housing 
agency premises (Turner et al., 2005);2 for this illegal behavior, no statistical evidence is needed. 
This test can be carried out via phone in a similar manner (Heylen & Van den Broeck, 2015).  
Also American fair housing organizations and other nonprofits investigate this topic using 
in-person audit tests.3 These studies can be divided into two groups. In one group, disabled actors 
are matched to non-disabled counterparts (Fair Housing Center of Washington, 2015; Fair Hous-
ing Center of Central Indiana, 2013; Fair Housing Project of Champlain Valley Office of Eco-
nomic Opportunity, 2003), as suggested by the Urban Institute. In the other group, disabled actors 
are unmatched (Murphy, 2007; Housing Opportunities Made Equal of Virginia, 2008). The pur-
pose of the latter audits is to investigate whether housing agents satisfy the request of reasonable 
accommodation, or housing unit modification, from disabled tenants. 
Results from a pilot experiment conducted by the Urban Institute suggest that blind ten-
ants could suffer discrimination, with a lower percentage of housing units made available to them 
(Turner et al., 2005). Additionally, audit reports from other American institutes show that blind 
tenants frequently receive refusals to waive restrictions and/or fees on their guide dogs (Fair 
                                                 
2
 The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 1990, states that privately owned businesses, such as housing agen-
cies, restaurants, retail stores, and taxicabs, should allow people with disabilities to enter the business premises with 
their service animals. 
3
 A list of these institutes is provided in Turner et al. (2005). Names of additional institutes might be found on the 
website of the US Department of Housing and Urban Development, at 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/partners/FHIP. This web page  
provides a list of those institutes that are granted funding by the Fair Housing Initiatives Program, from 2008 up to 
date, and use them to investigate discrimination in the housing market, not only through field experiments and not 
only against disable people. 
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Housing Center of Washington, 2015; Fair Housing Center of Central Indiana, 2013; Housing 
Opportunities Made Equal, 2008, Murphy, 2007). 
There are at least three concerns with in-person audit tests. First, in general, in-person au-
dit tests may produce biased results if some actors’ characteristics are not appropriately matched 
(Heckman, 1998; Heckman & Siegelman, 1993; Pager, 2007; Riach & Rich, 2002). These char-
acteristics are observed by the landlords but not by the researchers, and within the social sciences, 
they are called unobservable characteristics. Pager (2007) and Riach and Rich (2002) suggest 
that such characteristics might be reflected in subtle differences in the way applicant tenants in-
teract with housing brokers. Furthermore, within studies on blind tenants with a guide dog, not all 
dog’s features might be accounted for by the researchers and thus represent additional unobserv-
able characteristics.4 Taken together, these unobservable characteristics might convey systemati-
cally different information on the matched applicants, drive the differential treatment and thus 
cause biased estimates of discrimination (Pager, 2007). Second, a serious general threat to the 
validity of in-person audit tests is the experimenter effect (Pager, 2007). Actors might be 
(sub)consciously motivated (not) to obtain evidence of discrimination and consequently adjust 
their behavior during their interactions with brokers (Pager, 2007). These two concerns apply to 
in-person audit tests implemented over the phone as well. Third, available evidence on disability 
discrimination in the rental housing market usually comes from audit reports of fair housing or-
ganizations and other nonprofits, which typically are not designed to perform statistical inference 
(Turner et al., 2005).  
In alternative, researchers may use a written field experiment, also known as correspond-
ence test. This method has established itself in recent years as the field experiment that conveys 
                                                 
4
 For instance, conditions of the dog’s hair, the dog’s smell and behavior during interactions with brokers. 
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the clearest estimates for discrimination in the rental housing market.5 Since no actor is involved, 
the use of correspondence tests allows for complete control over the applications (Pager, 2007), 
thus reducing the bias caused by unobservable characteristics and by the experimenter effect. 
Moreover, written applications are delivered via the Internet, which provides three advantages: i) 
for the same budget, researchers can contact a larger amount of agents compared to those they 
could contact with in-person audit tests; ii) also apartment owners can be targeted, these are peo-
ple that rent out their own apartments, without having a specialized background like housing bro-
kers do; iii) the cost of the experiment is reduced since no actor is involved. 
However, the implementation of correspondence tests presents an obstacle: the disclosure 
problem (Ahmed & Hammarstedt, 2008). The target characteristic (for instance, gender, ethnicity 
or blindness) has to be clearly disclosed in a way that does not seem unnatural (Pager, 2007). 
Correspondence tests in the labor market that analyze gender and ethnic discrimination in hiring 
use applicants’ names as natural and clear disclosure devices (for the US, Bertrand & Mullaina-
than, 2004; for Sweden, Carlsson & Rooth, 2007). How could also blindness be naturally and 
clearly disclosed, since blind applicants’ names cannot be used as disclosure devices and these 
applicants would unlikely reveal their blindness directly in written applications?  
This is the first study to propose to solve the disclosure problem by mentioning the pres-
ence of a guide dog in the household of the disabled applicant. This disclosure device should 
work for two reasons: i) the guide dog is one of the internationally well recognized symbols of 
                                                 
5
 Because of the clean results, this methodology is used to investigate also other types of discrimination in the rental 
housing market, namely, discrimination based on ethnicity (for Italy, Baldini & Federici, 2011; for Sweden, Carlsson 
& Eriksson, 2013, and Ahmed, Andersson & Hammarstedt, 2010; for the US, Hanson & Hawley, 2011, and Car-
pusor & Loges, 2006; for Spain, Bosch, Carnero & Farré, 2010), gender (for Sweden, Ahmed & Hammarstedt, 
2008), sexual orientation (for Sweden, Ahmed & Hammarstedt, 2009, and Ahmed, Andersson & Hammarstedt, 
2008), age and employment status (for Sweden, Carlsson & Eriksson, 2013), single-parenting (for Canada, Lauster & 
Easterbrook, 2011), socioeconomic class (for Norway, Andersoon, Jakobsson & Kotsadam, 2012). 
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blind persons; ii) dogs are often seen as family members or friends by their owners,6 so it should 
seem natural to mention their presence in written applications. 
Once the disclosure problem is overcome, I proceed with the implementation of the corre-
spondence test. I prepare applications for three types of fictitious applicants: i) married tenants, 
which represent the control group;7 ii) married tenants where the wife is blind and owns a guide 
dog, which represent the treatment group;8 iii) married tenants where the wife is normal sighted 
and owns a pet dog, which is a second control group and represents an additional original meth-
odological element of this study. Then, I send these applications in response to online housing 
advertisements in Italy. 
The utilization of the second control group belongs to a strategy that aims at disentangling 
two aspects of disability discrimination through a sort of difference in difference. Based on a rea-
sonable assumption to be discussed later in the paper, the second control group allows me to in-
vestigate whether blind tenants assisted by a guide dog are discriminated against specifically be-
cause of their disability or because of the presence of the assistance dog. Therefore, the utilization 
of two control groups potentially allows me to extend the results to blind tenants with no guide 
dog; also, it allows me to obtain results that could concern disabled tenants with other assistance 
dogs as well. 
This study also specifically suggest to analyze two separate subsamples of advertisers, 
namely, housing brokers and apartment owners, because of their expected different knowledge of 
                                                 
6
 For Italy, this is confirmed by Eurispes (2013) and for the US by the American Veterinary Medical Association 
(2012). 
7
 The usage of households rather than individuals is a standard strategy adopted also in studies on sexual orientation 
discrimination in the rental housing market (for example, for Sweden, Ahmed & Hammarstedt, 2009), where the 
tenants’ sexual orientation is disclosed via a brief description of the household. 
8
 I have not used married tenants where the husband is blind because of the greater risk for these households of being 
discriminated based on their expected lower income. This risk is reduced by using a blind wife since women’s em-
ployment rates and wages are on average lower than men’s in most OECD countries, Italy included. Source: OECD 
Employment and Labour Market Statistics. 
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the legislation and risk of exposure in case of discriminatory behaviors. Housing brokers are pro-
fessional intermediary agents who advertise and rent out apartments that belong to someone else.9 
Apartment owners advertise and rent out their own apartments on their own. Housing brokers 
have a brokerage license and thus are more likely to know in detail the legislation. Moreover, 
they conduct more frequently rental housing transactions, which increase the risk of being taken 
to court in case of misconduct. All things considered, a legitimate expectation is that housing 
brokers discriminate against disabled tenants less often than apartment owners.  
Comparisons of the frequencies at which different tenants’ groups are invited to visit 
apartments provide a number of interesting results. Although the Italian legislation protects disa-
bled people from discrimination (law no. 67, 2006),10 advertisers discriminate: on average mar-
ried tenants with a blind wife assisted by a guide dog are less likely to receive an invitation to 
visit the apartment, compared to married tenants. Moreover, the results from the two separate 
subsamples of advertisers provide statistically significant evidence that this discrimination is 
driven by apartment owners’ behavior and also suggest that it is owed to the presence of the 
guide dog alone, not to the disability status. This is the first correspondence test to provide evi-
dence of this special type of illegal disability discrimination. Finally, as a byproduct of the exper-
imental strategy, there is statistically significant evidence of discriminatory (but legal in Italy) 
behavior against non-disabled tenants due to pet ownership. 
Virtually in the same period when this experiment was conducted (that is, the first half of 
2013), Heylen and Van den Broeck (2015) conducted an experiment in the Belgian rental housing 
                                                 
9
 They receive commissions for their service. For instance, after a housing broker has found a new tenant for a hous-
ing unit, the new tenant could be asked to pay the equivalent of one month rent to the broker. 
10
 According to this law, disabled people cannot be discriminated against based on their impairment (that is, blind-
ness) or, more indirectly, on factors related to it (that is, the presence of the guide dog). This law embodies the prin-
ciples suggested in Directive Proposal COM, 2008, 426. 
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market, which also focuses on blind people and uses a correspondence test.11,12 However, this 
study and mine were developed and conducted completely independently; moreover, besides the 
similar disability being considered and the utilization of the correspondence test, these two stud-
ies present five important differences. First, Heylen and Van den Broeck (2015) use a different 
strategy to solve the disclosure problem: fictitious disabled applicants (without assistance dog) 
ask landlords to describe the dwelling in detail and. Second, they use the matched application 
technique (that is, they send one enquiry per group of applicants to each advertisement), whereas 
I use the random assignment technique (that is, I send a single enquiry, to which the applicant’s 
group is randomly assigned to each advertisement). Later in the paper, I argue why my approach 
is more suitable when scholars implement correspondence tests in the housing market and com-
pare more than two tenants’ groups. Third, I use two control groups instead of one and try to iso-
late different types of disability discrimination. Fourth, they compare individual tenants, whereas 
my experiment approaches disability discrimination from a household perspective. Fifth, they 
focus on male disable tenants, whereas I focus on female disabled tenants. Therefore, these two 
studies are no directly comparable. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses experiment design, 
descriptive results and limitations of the study. Section 3 describes the model and the results. Sec-
tion 4 concludes. 
                                                 
11
 A third study, from Verhaeghe, Van de Bracht and Van de Putte (2016), presents similar experimental characteris-
tics to those proposed in these two studies, but their experiment started one year later, in 2014. 
12
 In their study, Heylen and Van den Broeck (2015) use also an in-person audit test via phone; additionally, they 
study gender and ethnic discrimination as well as disadvantageous treatment based on financial means. 
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2 Experiment Design and Descriptive Results 
2.1 Experiment Design 
I conducted a correspondence test in the Italian rental housing market from April 12 to June 22, 
2013, sending 1,000 fictitious written applications in response to advertisements on the Italian 
classified website Subito.it. The usage of the Internet to find a house is an increasingly popular 
solution among Italians: according to a survey performed by Nielsen, six million people used the 
Internet to find an apartment in 2013, in Italy.13 
A random assignment procedure was used to assign to each advertisement only one appli-
cation randomized over the applicant’s group. This procedure is utilized in a number of published 
researches on discrimination in the housing market (Carlsson & Eriksson, 2014; Baldini & 
Federici, 2011; Ahmed, Andersson & Hammarstedt, 2010; Carpusor & Loges, 2006; Lauster & 
Easterbrook, 2011; Andersson, Jakobsson & Kotsadam, 2012). There are three reasons for using 
this technique in lieu of the matched applications technique. First, since only one fictitious appli-
cation per advertisement is sent, the risk of being exposed is reduced. This risk is especially high 
for correspondence tests in the housing market because it is difficult to accurately keep track of 
advertisers’ identity. As Ahmed and Hammarstedt (2008) explain, advertisers may post multiple 
housing vacancies under different names. Many could be the reasons for this behavior; in particu-
lar, apartment owners might not want to indirectly and publicly disclose their wealth on the Inter-
net. Furthermore, housing brokers may post multiple vacancies under the name of their real estate 
agency. Therefore, advertisers could be accidentally contacted multiple times, could realize they 
                                                 
13
 See http://www.nielsen.com/it/it/insights/news/2014/cercare-casa-online-e-piu-semplice-e-veloce.html. This sur-
vey suggests also that Subito.it is one of the top Italian websites to search for apartments; see 
http://www.nielsen.com/it/it/insights/news/2014/cercare-casa-online-e-piu-semplice-e-veloce.html. This website is 
the same that Baldini and Federici (2011) use in their study on ethnic discrimination in the Italian rental housing 
market 
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are being deceived, and respond altering their behavior. Second, one application per housing unit 
minimizes advertisers’ inconvenience. The importance of these first two advantages increases 
with the increase in the amount of tenants’ groups being compared.14 Third, the random assign-
ment procedure is simpler to implement and cheaper than the matched applications technique. 
Even if this point is not grounded on a scientific basis, it is important in light of researchers’ time 
and budget constraints.  
The applications were randomized as follows. I created three tenants’ identities (that is, 
Andrea Rossi, Francesco Russo, and Alessandro Ferrari) and an email account for each of them.15 
Then, I entered them into a spreadsheet on which the three identities were repeated approximately 
330 times each; after that, I randomly ordered the identities by drawing without resampling using 
a normal distribution. Afterwards, I created three applicants’ statuses (that is, married tenants, 
married tenants with blind tenant plus guide dog, and married tenants with pet dog), I prepared a 
list on which the applicants’ statuses were repeated approximately 330 times each, and again I 
randomly ordered them by drawing without resampling using a normal distribution. Thereafter, I 
paired the list of applicants’ statuses with that of applicants’ identities. Finally, although corre-
spondence tests are usually focused on housing units in large cities, in my experiment I try to 
preserve geographic representativeness. Therefore, for all of the fictitious applicants, I also ran-
domly determined the general location of the apartment for which they had to apply (that is, the 
                                                 
14
 Consider a case similar to that in this experiment, where three groups of tenants are compared. If the experimenter 
used the random assignment procedure and randomly selected three housing units that by chance were managed by 
the same advertiser, this advertiser would receive three fictitious applications (that is, one fictitious application per 
vacant housing unit). If instead the experimenter used the matched technique, that same advertiser would receive one 
fictitious application per type of applicant per vacant housing unit (that is, nine fictitious applications in total). In the 
latter case the risk of exposure is much larger and the advertiser’s inconvenience is greater. 
15
 These are the most frequent Italian names and surnames. Sources: demo.istat.it and italygen.com. The three email 
accounts took the form of name.surname###@gmail.com. Names were randomly matched with surnames. A com-
plete randomization of the name and surname matching was not carried out because it would have implied handling 
nine email accounts, which would have increased the complexity of the experiment. 
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region of the apartment and whether the apartment had to be in a metropolitan city or not).16 The 
amount of applicants per region reflects the proportion of the national population living in that 
region, and in each region the number of applicants per metropolitan city reflects the proportion 
of the regional population living in that city.17  
I use household tenants rather than single tenants for two reasons. First, this strategy fol-
lows recent developments of the literature on economics of disability (Parodi & Sciulli, 2012). 
Second, although technologies exist that allow blind persons to use computers, some people 
might ignore their existence. The risk of being detected could increase if some landlords viewed 
with suspicion applications written by blind persons. Therefore, each application was written by 
the normal sighted husband, who revealed the composition of the household, which implied re-
vealing whether the wife owned a dog and whether this dog was either a well behaved pet dog or 
a guide dog. The specification “well behaved” serves to reduce as much as possible any per-
ceived difference between these two dog types, in terms of burden for the apartment.18 
Thus, the standard application for a vacant housing unit can be translated as follows:  
 
“Good morning/evening,  
                                                 
16
 Similar to the two previous steps, I first created the list of randomly ordered locations, and then I paired this list 
with the list of applicants. 
17
 A “metropolitan city” is an administrative institution that is expected to be operative as of 2015. However, this 
administrative institution was already described in Law no. 142, 1990, and, before that, it was solicited in the Italian 
Constitution, art. 114. A metropolitan city includes a large core city and its smaller surrounding towns; the core city 
and towns are closely related in terms of economic activities, provision of public services, cultural aspects and terri-
torial features. The metropolitan cities have large populations, ranging from hundreds of thousands to a few million 
inhabitants. 
18
 The version of this study which is published in my doctorate thesis (Fumarco, 2015) does not discuss the specifica-
tion “well behaved,” as it was lost in translation. 
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My family is interested in the apartment for rent described in the advertisement you post-
ed at the website Subito.it. I would like to move in with my wife [and her (guide/well behaved) 
dog]. 
If the apartment is still available, we would like to visit it.” 
 
The length of this message is similar to that of other studies that use a correspondence test to in-
vestigate discrimination in the housing market (Ahmed & Hammarstedt, 2008; Ahmed, An-
dresson & Hammarstedt, 2010, 2008; Hanson & Hawley, 2011; Baldini & Federici, 2011). 
When the actual experiment began, I sent the fictitious applications following the list of 
applicants’ identities with assigned apartment location. Applications were sent to the most recent 
advertisements to minimize the probability of contacting advertisers whose apartments had al-
ready been rented out. Advertisements for apartments smaller than 40 square meters and for those 
more expensive than 1,500€ per month were not taken into consideration. The size restriction was 
adopted because of the Italian law that legislates the maximum number of tenants per square me-
ter;19 this limit does not apply to pets. The rent restriction was adopted to avoid rent outliers.20 
Advertisements that explicitly discouraged dog owners from applying were not taken into con-
sideration. Advertisements on shared housing units were mostly posted by university students 
who searched for other student housemates, so they were not contacted. The contacted advertisers 
were given 31 days to answer the query; if they replied after this deadline, the observation would 
have been excluded from the analyses.21  
                                                 
19
 Ministerial Decree, June 20, 1975, art. 5, and its modification in 1986. 
20
 The estimated average monthly rent in Italy is 1,000€. Source: number.com. 
21
 Only one advertiser answered after 31 days, and thus was excluded from the analyses. 
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Each invitation to view an apartment was promptly declined to minimize any inconven-
ience to the advertiser.22 
2.2 Descriptive Statistics 
2.2.1 Invitation Rate 
The outcome of interest is the frequency at which applicants receive an invitation to visit apart-
ments they applied to. The invitation rate for each group is reported in Table 1.23  
 
**Table 1 about here** 
 
Group A comprises married tenants; Group B is the treatment group and consists of married ten-
ants where the wife is blind and is assisted by a guide dog; Group C is composed of married ten-
ants with a pet dog. 
This table suggests one important result. The comparison in the invitation rates for 
Groups A and B signals the presence of disability discrimination. This discrimination is due to 
the two characteristics that differ between Groups A and B, and landlords cannot discriminate 
disabled people based on neither of them: disability status (in this case, being blind) and specific 
condition related to the disability (in this case, owning a guide dog). Furthermore, comparing 
Groups A and C suggests the presence of discriminatory behaviors against pet dog owners, which 
is legal; the only difference between these two groups is the presence of a pet dog in Group C. 
Comparing invitation rates for Groups B and C suggests that tenants with a guide dog are treated 
                                                 
22
 When the matched application technique is used to compare more than two groups, also these messages may in-
crease the risk of detection. Once the advertiser notice two very similar messages that decline the invitation to the 
same housing unit, she might read anew the correspondent application messages, notice whether there are similarities 
also between them, and pay additional attention to future applications. 
23
 “Invitation rate” is equivalent to the traditional term “callback rate.” 
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equivalently to tenants with a pet dog; note that the dog type is not the only difference between 
the two groups: in Group B the wife is also blind.  Without an additional assumption, this com-
parison is not useful. Table 2 presents the independent group t-tests for the three comparisons. 
 
**Table 2 about here** 
 
The comparison of Groups B and C is meaningful contingently on what I call equality as-
sumption. This assumption requires that, from the point of view of the advertisers, there was no 
difference between well behaved pet dogs and guide dogs in terms of burden for the apartment, 
and advertisers had no preferences for one over the other. Discussions with members of associa-
tions for blind people suggest that this is a credible assumption. Moreover, exactly as it is for pet 
dogs, guide dogs’ behavior within housing units depends on the education they have received 
from their owners, and not from the education they have specifically received to become guide 
dogs. Finally, newspapers report frequent law violations on the free access of guide dogs to pub-
lic places and means of transportation (this specific aspect of blind people discrimination is regu-
lated by law no. 34, 1974); violators often justify their behaviors explaining that guide dogs are 
not different from pet dogs (for example, they bark and dirty the furniture).24  
If the equality assumption really reflects reality, the wife’s blindness would be the only 
difference between Groups B and C, and thus, this comparison would suggest that blindness per 
se is not the cause of discrimination, which is a positive result. Consequently, the 12 percentage 
                                                 
24
 In the US, violators of ADA who do not allow guide dogs in the business premises frequently report similar justi-
fications. 
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points gap in the invitation rate between Groups A and B seems to be caused by the presence of 
the guide dog alone. This is a special case of illegal discriminatory treatment of disabled people.  
The analysis of separate subsamples based on the advertiser type sheds additional light on 
the results. There are two different advertisers: housing brokers and apartment owners, who are 
expected to behave very differently. Housing brokers are professional intermediary agents who 
advertise and rent out housing units that belong to someone else; housing transactions and inter-
actions with applicants represent part of their daily job.  Apartment owners advertise and rent out 
their own housing unit on their own; housing transactions and interactions with applicants do not 
represent part of their daily job, rather they do it in their spare time (for instance, after the work-
ing day or in the weekend). In Italy, housing brokers must either pass an exam or spend a period 
of at least 12 months as practitioners in a housing agency in order to obtain the brokerage license 
(Federazione Italiana Mediatori Agenti d’Affari, 2006). Thus, housing brokers are more likely to 
have complete knowledge of the legislation compared to apartment owners. They also conduct 
more frequently housing transactions, which increases their risk of being taken to court in case of 
misconduct and thus might decrease discriminatory behaviors. Table 3 reports the main statistics 
for the three groups of tenants, divided by advertiser type. 25 
 
**Table 3 about here** 
 
                                                 
25
 This information can be obtained in two ways: i) indirectly, if the name of the advertiser is the name of a real es-
tate agency; ii) directly, the advertiser self-identifies as an agent (in this case, the word “Azienda” that is, “Compa-
ny”, appears in parenthesis by the advertiser’s name). 
15 
 
As expected, the statistics in Table 3 suggest that the two types of advertisers behave very differ-
ently: housing brokers do not discriminate against blind tenants with guide dogs, whereas apart-
ment owners do discriminate.  
There is an information fact worth mentioning in Table 3. Housing brokers invite poten-
tial applicants to a higher rate compared to apartment owners, independently from tenants’ type. 
The main possible reason could be that the interaction with applicants is part of housing brokers’ 
daily job. 
Independent group t-tests for the three comparisons in the two subsamples of advertisers 
give statistical support to this interpretation; see Table 4. 
 
**Table 4 about here** 
 
This finding is policy relevant. To decrease discrimination against households with blind tenants 
and guide dog, policy makers could provide incentives to these household tenants to turn to hous-
ing agencies to research an apartment. 
Statistics on the rejection rate provide with similar insights; see Table A.1 and A.2 in Ap-
pendix A. The rejection rate is the frequency at which applicants receive direct negative answers 
from advertisers.26 
Table A.3 and A.4 in Appendix A provides the exact number of invitations, non-
responses and rejections per group of tenants, and by advertiser type. 
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 Even if answers presented different reasons for directly rejecting applications, no distinction was made because of 
their limited amount. 
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2.2.2 Apartment and Advertisement Characteristics 
I collected extensive information from each advertisement. I have taken note of the city name, 
monthly rent, apartment size and presence of furniture; I have documented the presence of pho-
to(s) and telephone number; I recorded the date when each advertisement was posted, the date 
when each application was sent and the date when each response was received. The latter infor-
mation allowed me to compute the time it took for each application to receive an answer. Addi-
tionally, information on the population density of the town where the housing unit is located was 
retrieved from the 2012 census conducted by the Italian national institute of statistics (that is, 
ISTAT). From the same census, information on county size and blind population ratio at the 
county level was retrieved. Advertisements did not usually contain information on whether the 
apartment was relatively isolated, within a condominium, duplex, or townhouse. They did not 
even contain information on whether the apartment owner lived in the same building where the 
vacant apartment was located. 
I have also collected advertisers’ names. This information allowed me to distinguish be-
tween apartment owners and housing brokers, and to retrieve advertisers’ gender.27,28 The infor-
mation on advertisers’ names also provide further ground to support the decision to use the ran-
dom assignment over the matched application technique for this experiment. I have detected 
around 100 cases in which names and emails of respondents obviously differ from those dis-
played in the original advertisements.29 Non-transparent behaviors from advertisers make it hard 
                                                 
27
 In principle, this information could help distinguishing also between advertisers with Italian and foreign back-
ground. However, only a few observations have foreign sounding names. 
28
 In the version of this study which is published in my doctorate thesis (Fumarco, 2015), there were only a few ob-
servations on housing brokers’ gender. Since then, I have thoroughly checked anew the content of each email to gain 
this information also for this type of advertisers. 
29
 Some apartment owners have posted advertisements in name of friends or relatives, and acknowledge it in their 
answers. Few advertisers have signed multiple advertisements with different names, but answers were received from 
the same emails. Some advertisements report the same housing agency name, but housing brokers’ name in the email 
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to correctly keep track of them. Furthermore, about half of contacted housing brokers posted ad-
vertisements under the name of their real estate agency and answered applications without sign-
ing the email. Thus, frequently it is not possible to keep track of individual brokers either. In 
these cases, advertisers might have been accidentally contacted multiple times and the matched 
application technique would have increased the chances of detection.   
Table 5 reports the main descriptive statistics for these variables, for the whole sample 
and by advertiser type.  
 
**Table 5 about here** 
 
One interesting insight can be obtained from this table. Both apartment owners and housing bro-
kers answer on average very quickly to apartment queries (1 day), sometimes even on the same 
day (0 days). Quick responses as well as high response rates of this experiment must be due to the 
specific moments of the day I sent the applications, namely, early morning and late afternoon. 
These are arguably the two main moments of the day to check the email account, so my messages 
must have been often on top of receivers’ mailbox. 
Comparisons of the response time between the three groups of household tenants, in the 
two subsamples of advertisers, suggest that there is no differential treatment in terms of apart-
ment owners’ and housing brokers’ response time.30 
                                                                                                                                                              
differs. Moreover, a couple of answers from apartment owners suggest the existence of fraudulent schemes. Initial 
invitations were similar in the content to standard ones. However, after the polite rejection to these invitations, addi-
tional (seemingly automatic) follow up messages were received, which contained a similar storyline (that is, “I am a 
foreigner, live abroad, and have bought this apartment for my daughter who studied in an Italian university, but now 
moved to another country for work”) that concluded inviting to provide private sensitive information and a deposit 
before to visit the housing unit. 
30
 Results on independent group t-tests can be provided upon request. 
18 
 
2.3 Experiment Limitations 
Before I turn to the econometric analyses, I discuss three possible limitations to my experimental 
design. First, the disability status is signaled through the presence of a guide dog; this signal may 
be judged ambivalently.31 On one hand, less experienced advertisers, such as apartment owners, 
might fail to understand the cue. However, it is worth noting that some answers from apartment 
owners openly acknowledge blind tenants’ condition.32 On the other hand, someone might argue 
that this signal is too strong: besides the guide dog being considered as a friend, why should blind 
tenants disclose its presence? The reason is that blind people may wish to screen landlords, to 
find out who intend to discriminate based on dog ownership prior the visiting. Had they to dis-
close the presence of the guide dog only at the visiting, blind tenants might end up wasting time 
and energy for a pointless visiting. Moreover, failure to disclose the presence of the guide dog 
prior signing the rental contract could cause future frictions with neighbors and the landlord. For 
similar reasons, also normal sighted tenants might desire to screen landlords. 
Second, the size of the population of blind people assisted by guide dogs could be small in 
Italy, where there is no official statistics. For the UK, estimates suggest the presence of 4,500 
guide dog owners (Chur-Hansen et al., 2014). For the US, estimates suggest the presence of about 
9,000 guide dog owners (Eames et al., 2001). Had the size of this population to be equivalently 
small in Italy, one could argue that the additional time spent by Italian guide dog owners in send-
ing a few more applications to find an apartment would entail a low social cost. However, this 
argument is not a valid reason for neglecting the study of this population of disabled people, from 
                                                 
31
 The strength of the signal is a common concern in correspondence tests. Also seminal papers, such as those of 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) and Ahmed and Hammarstedt (2008), discuss this issue. 
32
 Some of them mention that the apartment is not on the ground floor, or that there are a few steps in front of the 
building door, and ask whether this is a problem for the wife. In other answers, they explicitly talk about the wife’s 
blindness. 
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the stand point of society’s fairness and equity principles, which are also reflected into the Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Moreover, based on the equality assumption, 
my experimental design allows the distinction between discrimination due to blindness from dis-
crimination due to the guide dog alone. Therefore, the results from this experiment could interest 
also two wider populations: households with a blind tenant without guide dog33 and households 
with a disabled tenant who owns an assistance dog (for instance, deaf people assisted by signal 
dogs; mobility impaired people helped by dog fetchers; people with psychiatric disabilities, such 
as Asperger syndrome, posttraumatic stress disorder, and autisms, assisted by therapy dogs; peo-
ple with health problems, such as diabetes and epilepsy, assisted by alert dogs).34 The extension 
of the results to blind tenants with no guide dog is straightforward, if the equality assumption 
reflects reality. Differently, these results might concern also other disabled tenants assisted by 
different specialized dogs only if the equality assumption were stretched further to include all 
types of assistance dogs: landlords do not differentiate between common pet dogs and guide 
dogs, and all other types of assistance dogs. 
Third, the equality assumption is based on anecdotal evidence and is not testable, what if 
it did not hold? The main finding of this experiment would still remain: blind tenants with guide 
dogs are discriminated against by apartment owners, and this behavior is illegal: they should be 
treated the same as normal sighted tenants with no dog. However, there would be problems in 
terms of results interpretation and their policy implications. If the equality assumption did not 
                                                 
33
 According to the 2012 ISTAT census, at the moment of the experiment there were 129,000 blind people in Italy; 
see http://www.salute.gov.it. In my dataset, the sum of the amounts of blind people per county is about 3,500 units 
smaller. In fact, my randomization process is meant to preserve geographic representativeness at regional and metro-
politan level, not at county level as well. Therefore, 5 counties out of 110 Italian counties ended up being excluded 
from the experiment: Gorizia (in Friuli-Venezia-Giulia), Benevento (in Campania), Ogliastra (in Sardinia), Medio 
Campidano (in Sardinia), Belluno (in Veneto). 
34
 There is no official estimate about the size of these populations either. 
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hold, the statistics displayed in Tables 1 and 3 could be produced if advertisers treated different 
dogs differently and these preferences were counterbalanced by preferences in opposite directions 
for disabled and non-disabled dog owners. Otherwise, invitation rates of Groups B and C could 
not be equal. In this case, it would not be possible to distinguish between discrimination based on 
the disability status from that based on the presence of the guide dog. 
There could be at least two types of discriminatory behaviors based on the disability sta-
tus: taste based (Becker, 1957) and statistical discrimination (Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973; Aigner 
& Cain, 1977). Advertisers could prefer to avoid contacts with blind people, even if this implied 
that they would forgo business opportunities; in this case, discrimination based on the disability 
status would be taste based. Advertisers could discriminate households with a blind tenant be-
cause they are perceived as being on average less financially stable, for example; in this case, 
discrimination based on the disability status per se would be statistical.  
The next section investigates through a series of econometric analyses whether the main 
results of this experiment are concealing discrimination based on disability status. 
3 Model and Results 
3.1 Main Results 
The main purpose of the econometric analyses in this section is to verify whether the randomiza-
tion process worked as intended. The data are analyzed with a linear probability model. The de-
pendent variable, Invitationi, is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the applicant has received an 
invitation to visit the housing unit and equals 0 if the applicant has not received an invitation or 
has received a negative answer. This outcome variable is regressed on two variables of interest: 
the dummy Blindi, where i is a household with a blind wife who owns a guide dog, and Dogi, 
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where i is a household with a pet dog.35 A vector of control variables, X, includes apartment and 
advertisement characteristics: apartment square meters and monthly rent; a dummy for the apart-
ment being in a metropolitan city; a dummy for the apartment being furnished; and dummies that 
indicates the presence of apartment pictures as well as phone number in the advertisement. 
Apartment square meters and monthly rent are centered; furthermore, monthly rent is rescaled, 
specifically, divided by 10. The model also includes F, a vector of fixed-effects,36 as well as a 
stochastic individual term, εi. The linear probability model looks as follows: 
 
Invitationi = β0 + β1Blindi + β2Dogi + βX + βF + εi  (1) 
 
This model is first estimated only with the independent variables of interest, then the vector of 
control variables is added, and finally also the vector of fixed-effects is included. Because the 
descriptive results suggest that housing brokers and apartment owners are very different in terms 
of discriminatory behaviors, the model is estimated on the two separate subsamples of advertis-
ers. The main estimates are reported in Table 6. 
 
**Table 6 about here** 
                                                 
35
 Household tenants without a pet dog and where the wife is not disabled (Group A) is the reference group. 
36
 This vector includes: dummies for each applicant’s identity (Andrea Rossi and Francesco Russo; Alessandro Fer-
rari is the baseline identity), dummies for each Italian region (Lombardy is the baseline region) and a dummy for the 
application being sent after a new condominium national regulation came into force. This vector includes: dummies 
for each applicant’s identity (that is, Andrea Rossi and Francesco Russo; Alessandro Ferrari is the baseline identity), 
and dummies for each Italian region (with Lombardy being the baseline region). One additional dummy being used 
indicates whether the application was sent after a new national condominium regulation came into force (law no. 
220, December 11, 2012, which came into force on June 18, 2013); according to this law, new condominium regula-
tions can no longer include pet restrictions. A natural experiment within this field experiment, to analyze the effect of 
this law on disability discrimination is not possible. This law applies neither to other types of apartments nor to con-
dominiums that enforced pet restrictions before this new law; moreover, advertisements did not presents information 
on the housing unit being in a condominium or not, and only 43 observations in total for Groups B and C were sent 
from June 18, 2013. 
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Table 6 confirms the insights provided by the descriptive results. These estimates show no evi-
dence of disability discrimination by housing brokers; in fact, β1^  is close to zero and never sta-
tistically significant. However, households where the wife is not blind and owns a pet dog experi-
ence discriminatory treatment; β2^   is highly statistically significant and negative. The difference 
between β1^   and β2^   is statistically significant. The model augmented with control variables 
and fixed-effects gives equivalent estimates. The combination of these results suggests that hous-
ing brokers treat household tenants where the wife is blind and owns a guide dog similarly to the 
reference group (that is, household tenants with no dog). Differently, Table 6 provides evidence 
of disability discrimination by apartment owners. Given that β1^   is negative and highly statisti-
cally significant, blind tenants are discriminated against; their invitation rate to visit an apartment 
is 21-24 percentage points lower than that of household tenants with no dog. Moreover, house-
hold tenants with a pet dog have an invitation rate that is 19-23 percentage points lower than that 
of the reference group; β2^   is highly statistically significant. The difference between the esti-
mates for β1^  and β2^   is never statistically significant. These results are robust to different speci-
fications.37 
Equivalent results are obtained also when using the rejection rate as outcome variable. 
The model specification for this analysis is similar to (1), the only difference is the outcome vari-
                                                 
37
 Estimates of the marginal effects from a probit model are equivalent to those in Table 6, and may be provided 
upon request. Two alternative linear models have been implemented. The first model does not distinguish between 
different dogs. A new variable for the presence of any type of dog is introduced, Canemi. This variable equals 1 
regardless of the nature of the wife’s dog; and it is interacted the variable Blindi. The model looks as follows: Invita-
tioni = β0 + β1Canemi + β2 Canemi*Blindi + βX + βF + εi. Therefore, this model treats guide and pet dogs as being 
the exactly same and Blindi now represents the group of households who have a (guide) dog and also a blind person. 
The results are equivalent to those in Table 6. In a second alternative linear model, which also provides equivalent 
results, I pool observations on housing brokers and apartment owners and introduce the variable Companyi, which 
equals 1 if the advertiser is a housing broker. This variable is introduced alone and interacted with both Blindi and 
Dogi. The model looks as follows: Invitationi = β0 + β1Blindi + β2Dogi + β3Companyi + β4Companyi*Blindi + 
β5Companyi*Dogi + βX + βF + εi.  
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able which is a dummy variable that equals 1 it the applicant has received a direct negative an-
swer. The results are reported in Table A.5 in Appendix A.38 
These findings on disability discrimination are in line with those from the two other cor-
respondence tests on this topic (Heylen & Van den Broeck, 2015; Verhaeghe, Van der Bracht & 
Van de Putte, 2015). 
Analyses with advertisers’ response time as outcome variable, confirm that both types of 
advertisers treat the three groups of tenant households in the same way in terms of response 
time.39 
Given the specific set of results in this study, if the equality assumption reflects reality, di-
rection and size of the estimates suggest that discrimination against households with blind tenants 
assisted by guide dogs occurs because of the presence of their guide dogs alone. The evidence on 
this particular type of disability discrimination is in line with that provided through in-person 
audit tests by American fair housing organizations and other nonprofits on refusal to provide rea-
sonable accommodation to guide dogs. These results raise concerns about the possible existence 
of a similar discrimination against disabled tenants assisted by other specialized dogs.  
On the bright side, statistical and taste based discrimination related to tenants’ disability 
status (in this case, blindness) seem to be ruled out.  
                                                 
38
 Equivalent results to those obtained with model (1) are obtained also with two different definitions of the outcome 
variable. In a first alternative definition of the outcome variable, Invitationi, is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
applicant has received an invitation to visit the housing unit and equals 0 if the applicant has not received an invita-
tion. Therefore, the observations on applications that received negative answers are dropped from the analysis. In a 
second alternative definition of the outcome variable, Invitationi, is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the applicant 
has received an invitation to visit the housing unit and equals 0 if the applicant has received a negative answer. 
Therefore, the observations on applications that did not receive an answer are dropped from the analysis. These re-
sults can be provided upon request. 
39
 These results can be provided upon request. 
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3.2 Additional Analyses 
The next two sections reports robustness and heterogeneity analyses. 
3.2.1 Robustness Checks 
To understand whether the interpretation of the results were correct, the first best would be to test 
the equality assumption. If this test rejected the assumption, there would be reasons to believe 
that the results from this experiment were owed to the concomitant presence of differential treat-
ment based on tenants’ disability and different preferences for different dogs in opposite direc-
tions. In fact, only in this situation Groups B and C could have the same invitation rates.  
It is not possible to test the equality assumption. However, it is possible to investigate 
whether the results are influenced by the presence of discrimination based on disability status; 
this is the purpose of the next two analyses. 
In presence of statistical discrimination based on ability to pay, one could expect the invi-
tation rate of households with a blind wife who owns a guide dog to vary with different levels of 
monthly rent. This variable is already present in model (1); in these additional analyses, it is also 
interacted with both Blindi and Dogi.  
The results are reported in Table B.1 in Appendix B. The discrimination level does not 
statistically significantly vary with rent, so statistical discrimination based on ability to pay could 
be ruled out. However, there could be statistical discrimination with respect to other characteris-
tics either of the applicants or of the apartments not included in the regression. 
The lack of statistical discrimination based on ability to pay seems to be reasonable in 
light of the experimental design. The experiment approaches disability discrimination from the 
perspective of a traditional family in a country were women’s employment rate and average wage 
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are lower than those of men. Therefore, whether the wife is disabled or not might not make a dif-
ference in terms of ability to pay the rent, from the landlords’ point of view. 
In presence of taste based discrimination, one could expect the invitation rate of house-
holds with a blind wife and a guide dog to vary with the intensity of contacts between blind and 
normal sighted people, based on the intergroup contact theory (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998). 
Most studies suggest the existence of a negative relationship: the larger the amount of contacts 
the lower the prejudices (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006).40  
Given the available information in the dataset, a proxy for the intensity of contacts could 
be represented by the relative amount of blind people per 1,000 inhabitants of the county where 
the apartment is located. For this analysis, this variable is demeaned, and then added alone as 
well as interacted with Blindi. Additionally, this model includes a control for county size, which 
is also demeaned and rescaled, specifically, being divided by 100. 
The results are reported in Table B.2 in Appendix B. The discrimination level does not 
statistically significantly vary with this proxy for intensity of contacts; alternative model specifi-
cations confirm this result.41.  
This result should be considered carefully. The proxy for intensity of contacts reflects the 
amount of possible contacts, similarly to other studies on the effect of intergroup contact on dis-
crimination (Finseraas et al., 2015, for a recent analysis; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006 for a literature 
                                                 
40
 In alternative, since blind people are not randomly distributed across counties, one could think of the amount of 
blind people in a county as being a proxy for the attitudes toward them in that county. Under this light, this analysis 
would be following the methodology first suggested by Carlsson and Rooth (2011), who investigate the presence of 
taste based discrimination in hiring by exploiting geographic variation in ethnic attitudes. 
41
 As an alternative specification, in lieu of (county blind population / [county population / 1,000]), I insert county 
blind population alone and interacted with Blindi , and control also for  (county population / 1,000) and (county size / 
100); the result is equivalent. In a second alternative specification, I introduce the ratio (county blind population / 
[county size / 100]) alone as well as interacted with Blindi and control for (county population / 1,000); also in this 
case, the result is equivalent). 
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review), however other aspects of intergroup contact are neglected (Carrell, Hoekstra & West, 
2015; Finseraas & Kotsadam, 2015; Pettigrew, 1998). 
These findings suggest the absence of taste based discrimination and statistical discrimi-
nation based on ability to pay. Thus, they seem to rule out discrimination based on disability sta-
tus, which support the interpretation of disability discrimination being due only to the guide dog. 
3.2.2 Heterogeneity Analyses 
The level of discrimination might vary based on additional characteristics that can confound the 
initial results. In particular, it might vary based on: vicinity of the housing unit to dog friendly 
amenities, presence of furniture, and advertisers’ gender. 
The vicinity to dog friendly amenities, namely, public or private gardens, might influence 
the level of discrimination. Some advertisers could discriminate household tenants who own ei-
ther guide or pet dogs out of concern for the dog’s wellbeing. Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning 
that even if this concern were genuine, differential treatment based on the presence of the guide 
dog would still represent illegal disability discrimination. 
In this dataset, there are two proxies for the availability of the housing unit to dog friendly 
amenities: the apartment being in a metropolitan city and the population density of the city where 
the apartment is located. The idea is that in densely populated cities, there are less green spaces. 
The dummy for the apartment being in a metropolitan city is already present in model (1); in 
these additional analyses it is also interacted with both Blindi and Dogi. In the alternative model 
specification, when the population density is used, this variable is introduced alone and interacted 
with both Blindi and Dogi; in this case, the dummy for the apartment being in a metropolitan city 
is dropped and the population density is demeaned and rescaled, specifically, divided by 1,000. 
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The results are reported respectively in Table C.1 and C.2 in Appendix C. It appears that 
the vicinity of the apartment to dog friendly amenities does not affect the level of discrimination. 
The level of discrimination could vary with the presence of furniture. Apartment owners 
might discriminate dog owners because they are concerned the dog could damage the furniture. 
Also in this case, even if the concern were genuine, differential treatment based on the presence 
of the guide dog would represent discrimination.  
There is already a dummy for the apartment being furnished in model (1); in this analysis, 
this variable is also interacted with both Blindi and Dogi.  
The results are reported in Table C.3 in Appendix C. The presence of the furniture does 
not appear to influence the level of discrimination. 
Finally, the level of discrimination could vary with advertisers’ gender. Gender differ-
ences could be due to a number of factors, such as cultural features or subconscious reasons; 
however, the study of the reasons for these different behaviors is beyond the scope of this study.  
In this analysis, a dummy variable for advertisers’ gender is introduced alone, with the 
reference group being composed of male advertisers, and interacted with Blindi and Dogi. 
The results from this analysis should be considered carefully: they could be affected by 
self-selection. In fact, information on gender is available for most apartment owners, but for only 
about half of the housing brokers. 
Table C.4 in Appendix C shows three interesting results.  First, independently from their 
own type, female advertisers invite applicants more frequently to visit the housing unit compared 
to male advertisers. Second, irrespectively of their own type, female advertisers consistently dis-
criminate households with a blind wife who owns a guide dog. Female advertisers seem to dis-
criminate also households where the wife is normal sighted and owns a pet dog; however, this 
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result is not statistically significant. Differently, male advertisers’ behavior changes dependently 
on their type, but irrespectively of tenants’ disability status. Male housing brokers do not discrim-
inate against dog owners, while male apartment owners do discriminate against them. Third, even 
though there is no statistical significant evidence of discrimination against households with a 
blind wife who owns a guide dog from male housing brokers, the results in this table suggest that 
the lack of evidence for disability discrimination from housing brokers, in Table 6, could be due 
to different behaviors between male and female housing brokers. 
Results in Table C.4 should be taken with a grain of salt. Estimates from the subsample of 
housing brokers could be biased because of self-selection, since gender is retrievable only for 
about half of them. Therefore, the results for this subsample are not directly comparable with 
those in Table 6. Additionally, because of non-transparent behaviors from advertisers, it is not 
possible to be absolutely sure that advertisers’ gender is what appears to be from their names. 
4 Discussion and Conclusions 
This study presents different original contributions. The most important is that it shows that with 
the appropriate experimental strategy, a correspondence test can be adapted to investigate also 
disability discrimination in the housing market.  
The focus of this research is on blind tenants assisted by guide dogs in the Italian rental 
housing market. I find sound evidence that blind tenants are discriminated against by apartment 
owners; this result is in line with those from the few similar studies on this topic. 
Additionally, given a reasonable assumption, I argue that this discrimination is due to the 
presence of the guide dog alone. According to both EU and Italian legislation, this behavior can 
be referred to as indirect discrimination because it is based on a disabled tenants’ characteristic 
that is indirectly related to the disability. Indirect discrimination occurs when an apparently neu-
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tral requirement that is assumed to apply to everyone (in this study, a pet restriction) has an unfair 
effect on disabled people. This is the first time that evidence on this type of discrimination is ob-
tained through a correspondence test.  
Within the American context, indirect discrimination could be interpreted as the refusal to 
provide reasonable accommodation to guide dogs. Under this light, the evidence on indirect dis-
crimination found in this study is in line with that provided by in-person audit tests conducted by 
American fair housing organizations and other nonprofits. 
On a positive side, these results seem to rule out direct discrimination, that is, discrimina-
tion due directly to tenants’ disability (in this study, blindness). This finding is confirmed by ro-
bustness checks. 
Heterogeneity analyses suggest that, in Italy, women consistently discriminate based on 
dog ownership. Whether women are housing brokers or apartment owners, and whether dog 
owners are disabled or not, do not seem to matter. This result should be considered carefully as it 
could be affected by self-selection. 
Awareness and information campaigns could decrease discrimination against households 
with blind tenants assisted by guide dogs. These campaigns should be tailored to apartment own-
ers and thus be diffused through standard media. Awareness campaigns could focus on the role of 
guide dogs, and convey the message that they do not only provide emotional support to their han-
dlers, as all other dogs do, but also assist them in multiple activities throughout the day. For in-
stance, guide dogs identify, and help to avoid, obstacles that their owners cannot identify alone; 
guide dogs help their handlers to board public transportation, and to proceed safely along roads as 
well as to cross them. Awareness campaigns could potentially favorably influence those apart-
ment owners who know the law but choose to ignore it, because they are not fully aware of the 
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importance of guide dogs for their owners. Differently, information campaigns should be con-
ducted to educate apartment owners about the legislation; some of them might in fact not be fully 
aware of what is considered discrimination.  
Based on the results of this study, there could be a third way to reduce discrimination. 
Since there is no evidence of discrimination from housing brokers, households with blind tenant 
and guide dog should be advised to turn to housing agencies. Since this service is costly, it could 
be (partially) reimbursed or financed by public institutes. 
This field experiment also documents discriminatory behaviors based on dog ownership 
in general. When it is directed to non-disabled people, this behavior is not illegal, in Italy. How-
ever, it entails negative effects on tenants’ happiness and wellbeing: dogs and other pets alleviate 
depression, loneliness, and ease the discomfort of aging to their owners. 
Future correspondence tests on disability discrimination in the housing market could pro-
ceed to investigate (at least) three aspects. First, the disabled people population is large and does 
not include only tenants affected by blindness. Therefore, to provide a complete picture of disa-
bled tenants’ situation in the rental housing market, future studies could target tenants affected by 
other disabilities, such as those affected by mental disabilities. Second, future research could im-
prove on the experimental strategy proposed in this study to analyze indirect discrimination and 
adjust it to accommodate other types of indirect discrimination, such as that related to mobility 
disabilities. Third, studies to come should explore whether disability interacts with other causes 
of discrimination and hence worsens conditions of tenants who are already at disadvantage in the 
rental housing market. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Invitation rates for the groups of tenants. 
Tenants’ group 
N Mean Std. Dev. 
(1) (2) (3) 
A (Not blind, no dog) 334 0.784 0.412 
B (Blind, guide dog) 332 0.666 0.472 
C (Not blind, pet dog) 333 0.634 0.482 
Note: Columns (1)-(2)-(3) report respectively: number of 
observations, means and standard deviations of groups’ 
invitation rates. 
 
 
Table 2. Independent group t-tests; pairwise comparison of the 
invitation rate. 
Tenants’ 
group 
A (Not blind,  
no dog) 
B (Blind,  
guide dog) 
C (Not blind,  
pet dog) 
A (Not blind,  
no dog)  
-3.459 
(0.000) 
-4.341 
(0.000) 
B (Blind,  
guide dog) 
-3.459 
(0.000)  
-0.865 
(0.387) 
C (Not blind, 
 pet dog) 
-4.341 
(0.000) 
-0.865 
(0.387)  
Note: T statistic (p values in parenthesis). 
 
 
Table 3. Invitation rates for the groups of tenants, by advertiser type. 
 Advertiser type 
Tenants’ groups 
Housing brokers Apartment owners 
N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
A (Not blind, no dog) 138 0.819 0.386 191 0.764 0.425 
B (Blind, guide dog) 133 0.812 0.392 191 0.555 0.498 
C (Not blind, pet dog) 148 0.709 0.455 182 0.577 0.495 
Note: In the panel “Housing brokers”, columns (1)-(2)-(3) report, respectively: number 
of observations and means and standard deviations of groups’ invitation rates from hous-
ing brokers. In the panel “Apartment owners”, columns (4)-(5)-(6) report the equivalent 
statistics for apartment owners. 
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Table 4. Independent group t-tests; pairwise comparison of the invitation rate, by  
 Housing brokers Apartment owners 
Tenants’ 
group 
A (Not blind,  
no dog) 
B (Blind,  
guide dog) 
C (Not blind,  
pet dog) 
A (Not blind,  
no dog) 
B (Blind,  
guide dog) 
C (Not blind,  
pet dog) 
A (Not blind,  
no dog)  
-0.144  
(0.886) 
-2.182 
(0.030) 
 -4.417 
(0.000) 
-3.926 
(0.000) 
B (Blind,  
guide dog) 
-0.144  
(0.886)  
-2.012  
(0.045) 
-4.417 
(0.000) 
 0.426 
(0.670) 
C (Not blind, 
 pet dog) 
-2.182 
(0.030) 
-2.012  
(0.045)  
-3.926 
(0.000) 
0.426 
(0.670) 
 
Note: T statistic (p values in parenthesis).    
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics, for the whole sample and by advertiser type. 
Variable Sample Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
       
Continuous variables       
       
Rent per month Whole sample 956 542.340 196.727 200 1,500 
 Housing brokers 411 552.698 215.903 250 1,500 
 Apartment owners 531 532.646 179.293 200 1,300 
       
Size
  
Whole sample 999 76.336 27.999 40 250 
(housing unit m2) Housing brokers 419 77.270 27.497 40 200 
 Apartment owners 564 75.117 28.203 40 250 
       
Town pop. density Whole sample 999 1.557 1.897 0.023 12.224 
(town pop. /  Housing brokers 419 1.527 1.760 0.024 12.224 
[city km2 * 1,000] ) Apartment owners 564 1.584 1.993 0.023 12.109 
       
Answer delay Whole sample 741 1.061 1.709 0 22 
(days to answer) Housing brokers 340 1.065 1.433 0 15 
 Apartment owners 390 1.067 1.937 0 22 
       
County blind pop. ratio Whole sample 976 2.165 0.851 1.117 7.674 
(county blind pop. /  Housing brokers 411 2.166 0.862 1.117 7.674 
[county pop. / 1,000]) Apartment owners 549 2.160 0.847 1.117 7.674 
       
County size Whole sample 997 30.629 17.579 2.125 73.984 
(county km2 / 100) Housing brokers 418 29.935 17.043 2.125 73.984 
 Apartment owners 563 31.033 17.945 2.125 73.984 
       
Dummy variables       
       
Metro Whole sample 999 0.156 0.363   
 Housing brokers 419 0.134 0.341   
 Apartment owners 564 0.168 0.374   
       
Phone Whole sample 990 0.896 0.305   
 Housing brokers 417 0.978 0.145   
 Apartment owners 557 0.871 0.371   
       
Furniture Whole sample 999 0.581 0.494   
 Housing brokers 419 0.506 0.501   
 Apartment owners 564 0.640 0.480   
       
Photo Whole sample 999 0.684 0.465   
 Housing brokers 419 0.766 0.424   
 Apartment owners 564 0.631 0.483   
       
Female Whole sample 792 0.400 0.490   
 Housing brokers 230 0.456 0.499   
 Apartment owners 553 0.376 0.485   
       
Company Whole sample 983 0.426 0.495   
Note: The sample is composed of 1,000 observations, 1 is excluded because was received after the 31 day dead-
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line; for each variable the amount might be lower than 999 because of missing values. For each variable, the dif-
ference between the amount of observations in the whole sample and the sum of observations for housing brokers 
and apartment owners is due to missing values of the variables and 16 missing values on advertiser’s type. Size 
and rent per month are reported as they appear originally; the other continuous variables are rescaled, following the 
econometric analyses in the next section, but are not demeaned. 
 
 
Table 6. Linear probability model main estimates by advertiser type. 
 Housing brokers Apartment owners 
 (1.A) (1.B) (1.C) (2.A) (2.B) (2.C) 
       
Constant 0.819*** 0.699*** 0.711*** 0.764*** 0.852*** 0.824*** 
(Not blind, no dog) (0.032) (0.161) (0.192) (0.034) (0.059) (0.077) 
       
β1^   -0.007 -0.009 -0.010 -0.209*** -0.227*** -0.239*** 
(Blind, guide dog) (0.045) (0.047) (0.050) (0.065) (0.063) (0.066) 
       
β2^   -0.109** -0.119*** -0.112** -0.187*** -0.208*** -0.232*** 
(Not blind, pet dog) (0.041) (0.041) (0.044) (0.040) (0.042) (0.041) 
       
Control variables N Y Y N Y Y 
Fixed-effects N N Y N N Y 
       
P value (β1^  - β2^ ) 0.029 0.026 0.043 0.737 0.785 0.917 
       
R squared 0.015 0.029 0.072 0.038 0.060 0.122 
N 419 409 409 564 525 525 
Note: Missing apartment characteristics, including the type of agent, cause the total sample to be small-
er than 999 observations. Group A, which includes married tenants, is the reference group. The refer-
ence region is Lombardy, in columns (1.C) and (2.C). Robust standard errors corrected for day of in-
quiry are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A.1 Negative answer rates for the groups of applicants. 
Tenants’ group 
N Mean Std. Dev. 
(1) (2) (3) 
A (Not blind, no dog) 334 0.021 0.143 
B (Blind, guide dog) 332 0.057 0.233 
C (Not blind, pet dog) 333 0.075 0.264 
Note: Columns (1)-(2)-(3) report, respectively: number of ob-
servations and means and standard deviations of groups’ nega-
tive answer rates. 
 
 
Table A.2 Negative answer rates for the groups of applicants, by advertiser type. 
 Advertiser type 
Tenants’ groups 
Housing brokers Apartment owners 
N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
A (Not blind, no dog) 138 0.014 0.120 191 0.026 0.160 
B (Blind, guide dog) 133 0.022 0.149 191 0.084 0.278 
C (Not blind, pet dog) 148 0.074 0.263 182 0.077 0.267 
Note: In the panel “Housing brokers”, columns (1)-(2)-(3) report, respectively: number 
of observations and means and standard deviations of groups’ negative answer rates 
from housing brokers per group of applicants. In the panel “Apartment owners”, col-
umns (4)-(5)-(6) report the equivalent statistics for apartment owners per group of appli-
cants. For each group of tenants, the total number of observations in the two panels is 
lower than that reported in Table 1 because of missing information on the advertiser 
type. 
 
 
Table A.3 Counts of invitations, non-responses and negative answers for the 
groups of applicants. 
Tenants’ group 
Invitations Non-responses Negative answers 
(1) (2) (3) 
A (Not blind, no dog) 262 65 7 
B (Blind, guide dog) 221 92 19 
C (Not blind, pet dog) 211 97 25 
Note: Columns (1)-(2)-(3) report, respectively: number of invitations, non-
responses, and negative answers per group of applicants. 
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Table A.4 Counts of invitations, non-responses and negative answers for the groups of applicants, by advertiser type. 
 Advertiser type 
Tenants’ groups 
Housing brokers Apartment owners 
Invitations Non-responses Negative answers Invitations Non-responses Negative answers 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
A (Not blind, no dog) 113 23 2 146 40 5 
B (Blind, guide dog) 108 22 3 106 69 16 
C (Not blind, pet dog) 105 32 11 105 63 14 
Note: In the panel “Housing brokers”, columns (1)-(2)-(3) report, respectively: number of invitations, non-responses and negatives 
answers from housing brokers per group of applicants. In the panel “Apartment owners”, columns (4)-(5)-(6) report the equivalent 
statistics from apartment owners per group of applicants. For each group of tenants, the total number of observations in the two 
panels is lower than that reported in Table 1 because of missing information on the advertiser type. 
 
 
Table A.5 Linear probability model estimates, rejection rate as outcome variable. 
 Housing brokers Apartment owners 
 (1.A) (1.B) (1.C) (2.A) (2.B) (2.C) 
       
Constant 0.014 0.077 0.025 0.026** -0.044* -0.037 
(Not blind, no dog) (0.0102) (0.105) (0.110) (0.012) (0.024) (0.033) 
       
β1^   0.008 0.002 0.002 0.058** 0.061** 0.058** 
(Blind, guide dog) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
       
β2^   0.056*** 0.060** 0.065*** 0.051* 0.053* 0.043* 
(Not blind, pet dog) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.028) (0.024) 
       
Control variables N Y Y N Y Y 
Fixed-effects N N Y N N Y 
       
R squared 0.020 0.030 0.111 0.011 0.045 0.121 
N 419 409 409 564 525 525 
Note: Missing apartment characteristics, including the type of agent, cause the total sample to be smaller than 
999 observations. Group A, which comprises married tenants, is the reference group. The reference region is 
Lombardy, in columns (1.C) and (2.C). Robust standard errors corrected for day of inquiry are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix B 
 
Table B.1 Linear probability model estimates, interactions with rent. 
 Housing brokers Apartment owners 
 (1.A) (1.B) (1.C) (2.A) (2.B) (2.C) 
       
Constant 0.828*** 0.690*** 0.704*** 0.781*** 0.853*** 0.823*** 
(Not blind, no dog) (0.032) (0.157) (0.185) (0.034) (0.059) (0.077) 
       
β1^   -0.016 -0.010 -0.010 -0.229*** -0.226*** -0.238*** 
(Blind, guide dog) (0.046) (0.048) (0.051) (0.065) (0.064) (0.067) 
       
β2^   -0.114*** -0.118*** -0.110** -0.210*** -0.207*** -0.231*** 
(Not blind, pet dog) (0.042) (0.041) (0.044) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) 
       
β3^    -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(Rent) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
β5^   0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(Blind, guide 
dog)×(Rent) 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
β6^   -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(Not blind, pet 
dog)×(Rent) 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Control variables N Y Y N Y Y 
Fixed-effects N N Y N N Y 
       
R squared 0.021 0.031 0.073 0.048 0.061 0.123 
N 411 409 409 531 525 525 
Note: The variable Rent is centered and divided by 10. Missing apartment characteristics, including the type of 
agent, cause the total sample to be smaller than 999 observations. Group A, which comprises married tenants, is 
the reference group. Robust standard errors corrected for day of inquiry are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. 
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Table B.2 Linear probability model estimates, interaction with county blind people per 1,000 inhabitants. 
 Housing brokers Apartment owners 
 (1.A) (1.B) (1.C) (2.A) (2.B) (2.C) 
       
Constant 0.774*** 0.623*** 0.583*** 0.895*** 0.969*** 0.852*** 
(Not blind, no dog) (0.0645) (0.162) (0.199) (0.0697) (0.0838) (0.114) 
       
β1^   0.0537 0.0642 0.0349 -0.331** -0.344** -0.343** 
(Blind, guide dog) (0.105) (0.113) (0.113) (0.145) (0.144) (0.142) 
       
β2^   -0.0897** -0.0996** -0.0982** -0.173*** -0.200*** -0.222*** 
(Not blind, pet dog) (0.0419) (0.0410) (0.0453) (0.0400) (0.0417) (0.0418) 
       
β3^    0.0165 0.0246 0.0620* -0.0623** -0.0630** -0.0323 
(County blind rate) (0.0228) (0.0226) (0.0369) (0.0257) (0.0253) (0.0523) 
       
β5^   -0.0211 -0.0278 -0.0142 0.0556 0.0533 0.0484 
(Blind, guide dog)× (0.0403) (0.0417) (0.0406) (0.0550) (0.0550) (0.0539) 
(County blind rate)       
       
Control variables N Y Y N Y Y 
Fixed-effects N N Y N N Y 
       
R squared 0.021 0.034 0.073 0.049 0.071 0.124 
N 411 401 401 549 512 512 
Note: The variable “County blind population” is given by the ratio “county blind population / (county popula-
tion / 1000).” Missing apartment characteristics, including the type of agent, cause the total sample to be small-
er than 999 observations. Group A, which comprises married tenants, is the reference group. Robust standard 
errors corrected for day of inquiry are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix C 
 
Table C.1 Linear probability model estimates, interactions with metropolitan city. 
 Housing brokers Apartment owners 
 (1.A) (1.B) (1.C) (2.A) (2.B) (2.C) 
       
Constant 0.825*** 0.700*** 0.713*** 0.795*** 0.867*** 0.837*** 
(Not blind, no dog) (0.033) (0.161) (0.195) (0.034) (0.060) (0.075) 
       
β1^   -0.018 -0.028 -0.035 -0.239*** -0.254*** -0.263*** 
(Blind, guide dog) (0.050) (0.051) (0.055) (0.067) (0.069) (0.071) 
       
β2^   -0.107** -0.118** -0.113** -0.194*** -0.221*** -0.241*** 
(Not blind, pet dog) (0.049) (0.048) (0.050) (0.038) (0.042) (0.040) 
       
β3^    -0.075 -0.130 -0.161 -0.195** -0.201** -0.176 
(Metro) (0.135) (0.134) (0.139) (0.090) (0.096) (0.107) 
       
β4^    0.101 0.135 0.174 0.187 0.162 0.147 
(Blind, guide dog)×(Metro) (0.147) (0.148) (0.150) (0.138) (0.143) (0.146) 
       
β5^   0.007 0.008 0.033 0.064 0.077 0.059 
(Not blind, pet dog)×(Metro) (0.186) (0.179) (0.183) (0.139) (0.146) (0.149) 
       
Control variables N Y Y N Y Y 
Fixed-effects N N Y N N Y 
       
R squared 0.017 0.032 0.075 0.049 0.063 0.125 
N 419 409 409 564 525 525 
Note: Missing apartment characteristics, including the type of agent, cause the total sample to be smaller than 
999 observations. Group A, which comprises married tenants, is the reference group. Robust standard errors 
corrected for day of inquiry are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table C.2 Linear probability model estimates, interactions with population density. 
 Housing brokers Apartment owners 
 (1.A) (1.B) (1.C) (2.A) (2.B) (2.C) 
       
Constant 0.815*** 0.667*** 0.691*** 0.761*** 0.834*** 0.839*** 
(Not blind, no dog) (0.032) (0.161) (0.193) (0.034) (0.057) (0.077) 
       
β1^   -0.003 -0.011 -0.0073 -0.207*** -0.223*** -0.236*** 
(Blind, guide dog) (0.046) (0.047) (0.051) (0.065) (0.064) (0.066) 
       
β2^   -0.106** -0.120*** -0.111** -0.184*** -0.210*** -0.231*** 
(Not blind, pet dog) (0.041) (0.040) (0.044) (0.040) (0.042) (0.040) 
       
β3^    -0.034 -0.040* -0.051** -0.025 -0.031 -0.058** 
(Density) (0.025) (0.023) (0.025) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) 
       
β4^    0.045 0.047 0.053* 0.030 0.033 0.038 
(Blind, guide dog)×(Density) (0.028) (0.029) (0.030) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) 
       
β5^   0.043 0.048 0.057* 0.013 0.023 0.028 
(Not blind, pet dog)×(Density) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
       
Control variables N Y Y N Y Y 
Fixed-effects N N Y N N Y 
       
R squared 0.022 0.035 0.081 0.042 0.057 0.130 
N 419 409 409 564 525 525 
Note: Missing apartment characteristics, including the type of agent, cause the total sample to be smaller than 
999 observations. Group A, which comprises married tenants, is the reference group. Robust standard errors 
corrected for day of inquiry are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table C.3 Linear probability model estimates, interactions with furniture. 
 Housing brokers Apartment owners 
 (1.A) (1.B) (1.C) (2.A) (2.B) (2.C) 
       
Constant 0.792*** 0.694*** 0.712*** 0.720*** 0.841*** 0.818*** 
(Not blind, no dog) (0.043) (0.165) (0.197) (0.066) (0.077) (0.010) 
       
β1^   0.025 0.028 0.037 -0.191 -0.224* -0.248* 
(Blind, guide dog) (0.054) (0.057) (0.060) (0.120) (0.124) (0.128) 
       
β2^   -0.120* -0.114 -0.114 -0.151 -0.174* -0.207* 
(Not blind, pet dog) (0.064) (0.070) (0.071) (0.103) (0.104) (0.104) 
       
β3^    0.057 0.051 0.070 0.073 0.053 0.042 
(Furniture) (0.055) (0.051) (0.062) (0.076) (0.083) (0.088) 
       
β4^    -0.067 -0.075 -0.094 -0.031 -0.005 0.013 
(Blind, guide dog)×(Furniture) (0.082) (0.075) (0.076) (0.128) (0.138) (0.139) 
       
β5^   0.009 -0.013 -0.000 -0.061 -0.051 -0.038 
(Not blind, pet dog)× 
(Furniture) 
(0.100) (0.101) (0.102) (0.127) (0.132) (0.139) 
       
Control variables N Y Y N Y Y 
Fixed-effects N N Y N N Y 
       
R squared 0.019 0.031 0.074 0.041 0.061 0.123 
N 419 409 409 564 525 525 
Note: Missing apartment characteristics, including the type of agent, cause the total sample to be smaller than 
999 observations. Group A, which comprises married tenants, is the reference group. Robust standard errors 
corrected for day of inquiry are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
47 
 
Table C.4 Linear probability model estimates, interactions with advertiser’s gender. 
 Housing brokers Apartment owners 
 (1.A) (1.B) (1.C) (2.A) (2.B) (2.C) 
       
Constant 0.875*** 0.644*** 0.708*** 0.714*** 0.797*** 0.781*** 
(Not blind, no dog) (0.053) (0.192) (0.240) (0.047) (0.072) (0.083) 
       
β1^   0.101* 0.115* 0.107 -0.164** -0.182** -0.188** 
(Blind, guide dog) (0.060) (0.063) (0.079) (0.075) (0.073) (0.073) 
       
β2^   -0.011 0.004 0.016 -0.120** -0.148** -0.170*** 
(Not blind, pet dog) (0.066) (0.069) (0.075) (0.058) (0.060) (0.061) 
       
β3^    0.125** 0.136** 0.155** 0.141** 0.140** 0.129* 
(Female) (0.053) (0.056) (0.065) (0.057) (0.059) (0.068) 
       
β5^   -0.165** -0.163** -0.170** -0.153* -0.152* -0.163** 
(Blind, guide dog)×(Female) (0.073) (0.071) (0.087) (0.083) (0.082) (0.080) 
       
β5^   -0.082 -0.096 -0.109 -0.166* -0.144 -0.144 
(Not blind, pet dog)×(Female) (0.090) (0.093) (0.095) (0.089) (0.091) (0.097) 
       
Control variables N Y Y N Y Y 
Fixed-effects N N Y N N Y 
       
R squared 0.039 0.069 0.115 0.047 0.068 0.127 
N 230 226 226 553 514 514 
Note: Missing apartment characteristics, including the type of agent, cause the total sample to be smaller than 
999 observations. Group A, which comprises married tenants, is the reference group. The reference macro 
region is Southern Italy. Robust standard errors corrected for day of inquiry are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
